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New  experimental  evidence  extending  the  investigation  of  free-riding  behavior  in  public  goods 
provision  is  presented.  Procedures  are  developed  to  deal  with  the  logistical  problems  inherent  in 
experiments  involving  many  subjects.  Data  from  Voluntary  Contribution  Mechanism  experi- 
ments  are  reported  utilizing  group  sizes  of  4,  10,  40  and  100.  These  experiments  provide 
replicable  results  that  contradict  the  widely  held  view  that  a  group’s  ability  to  provide  the 
optimal  level  of  a  pure  public  good  is  inversely  related  to  group  size.  On  the  contrary,  groups  of 
size  40  and  100  provided  the  public  good  more  efficiently  than  groups  of  size  4  and  10.  Several 
possible  alternative  explanations  are  discussed. 
1.  Introduction 
Over  the  past  decade,  the  use  of  computer-based  laboratory  experiments  to 
study  resource  allocation  mechanisms  for  both  private  and  public  goods  has 
proliferated.  The  vast  majority  of  this  research  has  employed  the  same  basic 
procedural  framework  for  executing  experiments:  a  relatively  small  (e.g.  lo- 
person)  group  of  subjects  arrive  at  the  lab  at  the  same  time,  participate  in 
the  experiment,  are  paid  a  performance-based  cash  reward  at  the  experi- 
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ment’s  conclusion,  and  leave.  This  standard  framework  presents  two  distinct 
problems  when  one  wishes  to  focus  on  ‘large’  (e.g.  IOO-person)  decision- 
making  groups:  physical  constraints  rooted  in  the  size  of  the  lab  and  number 
of  computer  workstations  available,  and  financial  constraints  rooted  in  the 
magnitude  of  the  subject  payments  necessary  to  motivate  a  large  group  of 
participants.  It  is  thus  quite  understandable  that  small-group  experiments 
predominate  and,  in  the  absence  of  evidence  to  the  contrary,  are  implicitly 
assumed  to  characterize  behavior  in  similar,  large-group  decision-making 
environments.  The  validity  of  this  assumption  is  critical  if  ‘parallelism’ 
between  the  laboratory  and  a  naturally  occurring  environment  (with  many 
decision-making  agents)  is  essential  to  the  relevance  of  the  research.  This  is 
presumably  the  case  in  experimental  research  focusing  on  public  policy 
issues. 
The  research  reported  here  has  two  primary  objectives.  The  first  objective 
is  to  explore  the  extent  to  which  results  from  previous  small-group  experi- 
ments  on  the  voluntary  provision  of  a  pure  public  good  survive  in  a  large- 
group  setting.  The  second  objective  is  methodological  -  to  document  and 
discuss  the  general  procedural  framework  used  to  overcome  the  problems 
associated  with  conducting  large-group  experiments  mentioned  above.  We 
compare  the  use  of  cash  vs.  extra-credit  point  incentive  structures,  and 
experiments  lasting  about  an  hour  vs.  experiments  lasting  several  weeks. 
Our  interest  in  the  first  objective  is  motivated  in  part  by  the  common 
premise  in  economics  and  other  social  sciences  that  the  suboptimality  of  the 
provision  of  a  public  good  will  increase  with  increases  in  group  size.  The 
logic  and  empirical  evidence  which  might  support  this  premise  is  not  always 
clearly  specified.  Evidence  from  field  studies  is  flawed  by  a  lack  of  control 
over  critical  environmental  parameters  and  the  inability  to  observe  prefer- 
ences  and  hence  to  measure  the  degree  of  suboptimality.  Evidence  from 
laboratory  studies  is  based  primarily  on  data  from  literally  thousands  of  two- 
person  games  and  a  smaller  set  of  N-person  games  with  group  sizes  that 
have  rarely  exceeded  10.  These  are  very  small  decision-making  groups  in 
comparison  with  the  group  sizes  one  might  expect  to  find  in  many  field 
environments.  Thus,  the  common  premise  that  free  riding  becomes  more 
severe  as  group  size  increases,  ceteris  paribus,  does  not  appear  to  be  based 
on  an  extensive  empirical  foundation. 
Building  on  research  presented  by  Isaac  and  Walker  (1988),  this  paper 
presents  new  evidence  regarding  the  existence  of  a  pure  group  size  effect  in 
the  provision  of  pure  public  good.  Our  experiments  utilize  group  sizes 
ranging  from  4  to  100  and  provide  replicable  results  that  contradict  the 
widely  held  view  that  a  group’s  ability  to  provide  the  optimal  level  of  a  pure 
public  good  is  necessarily  inversely  related  to  group  size.  The  next  section 
summarizes  the  components  of  the  voluntary  contribution  mechanism  and 
briefly  reviews  the  experimental  literature  on  public  goods  provision  utilizing R.M.  Isaac  et  al.,  Group  size  and  the  voluntary  provision  of  public  goods  3 
this  institution.  Section  3  describes  the  experimental  environment  and 
procedural  framework  developed  for  our  new  experiments.  Section  4  reports 
our  initial  experimental  results.  Section  5  presents  possible  explanations  for 
the  inconsistency  between  these  results  and  the  predictions  of  the  standard 
complete  information  Nash  equilibrium  model.  Section  6  reports  the  results 
from  additional  experiments  designed  to  provide  further  insight  into  the 
observed  discrepancies  between  the  standard  Nash  model  and  our  results. 
Finally,  section  7 summarizes  our  experimental  results. 
2.  The  voluntary  contribution  mechanism 
The  essence  of  the  voluntary  contribution  mechanism  (VCM)  is  that  each 
individual  in  a  group  must  decide  how  to  allocate  an  endowment  of  a 
productive  factor  between  a  private  good  (where  consumption  benefits  accrue 
only  to  the  individual)  and  a  group  good  (where  consumption  benefits  accrue 
to  all  group  members). 
2.1.  Experimental  implementation 
The  laboratory  version  of  VCM  utilized  in  the  experiments  presented  here 
was  implemented  in  a  sequence  of  ten  decision-making  rounds.  At  the  start 
of  each  round,  individual  i  was  endowed  with  Zi  tokens  which  had  to  be 
divided  between  a  ‘private  account’  and  a  ‘group  account’.  Tokens  could  not 
be  carried  across  rounds.  Each  token  placed  in  the  private  account  earned  pi 
cents  with  certainty.’  For  a  given  round,  let  m,  represent  individual  i’s 
allocation  of  tokens  to  the  group  account  and  xrnj  represent  the  sum  of 
tokens  placed  in  the  group  account  by  all  other  individuals  (j  #  i).  Each 
individual  earned  [G(mi  + c  mj)]/iv  cents  from  the  group  account.  Because 
each  individual  received  a  l/N  share  of  the  total  earnings  from  the  group 
account,  the  group  account  was  a  pure  public  good.  The  specification  of  the 
group  account  payoff  function  is  one  of  many  that  could  be  utilized  to  create 
a  laboratory  public  good.  Thus,  a  representative  individual’s  utility  function 
in  any  one  period  can  be  written  as  Ui[pi(Zi-m,)  +(G(mi+~mi)/N)].  The 
marginal  per  capita  return  from  the  group  account  (MPCR)  is  defined  as  the 
ratio  of  benefits  to  costs  for  moving  a  single  token  from  the  individual  to  the 
group  account,  or  [G’(  .)/N]/pi.  In  the  experiments  reported  here,  pi  and  the 
functions  G( .)  were  chosen  so  that  the  Pareto  optimum  (defined  simply  as 
the  outcome  that  maximizes  group  earnings)  was  for  each  individual  to  place 
all  tokens  in  the  group  account  (i.e.  to  set  mi=Zi).  The  single-period 
‘In  the  experiments  reported  here  p,=$O.Ol  for  all  i.  This  need  not  be  the  case.  Fisher  et  al. 
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dominant  strategy  for  each  individual  i,  however,  was  for  each  subject  to 
place  zero  tokens  in  the  group  account  because  pi and  G( .)  were  chosen  so 
that  the  MPCR  -c 1. Given  the  finite  number  of decision  rounds,  the  outcome 
mi=O,  Vi, is  also  the  unique,  backward  unravelling,  complete  information, 
multi-period  Nash  equilibrium.  This  will  be  referred  to  as  a  complete  free- 
riding  outcome. 
Each  individual’s  information  set  included:  the  number  of  rounds,  Zi  (i’s 
own  token  endowment  for  each  round),  CZ,  (the  groups’  aggregate  token 
endowment  for  each  round),  pi (earnings  per  token  from  i’s private  account), 
N  (group  size),  and  G( .)/N  (per  capita  earnings  function  for  the  group 
account  presented  in  tabular  form).’  It  was  explained  that  the  decisions  for 
each  round  were  binding  and  that  end-of-experiment  rewards  would  be based 
on  the  sum  of  earnings  from  all  rounds.  Prior  to  the  start  of  each  round, 
participants  were  shown  information  on  their  own  earnings  for  the  previous 
round  as well as the  total  number  of tokens  placed  by  the  entire  group  in the 
group  account.  During  each  round,  subjects  could  view  their  personal  token 
allocations,  earnings,  and  total  tokens  placed  in  the  group  account  for  all 
previous  rounds. 
2.2.  Previous  experimental  results 
A  large  body  of  experimental  research  addresses  the  empirical  validity  of 
the  free-rider  hypothesis  utilizing  various  implementations  of  the  voluntary 
contributions  mechanism.  See,  for  example,  Marwell  and  Ames  (1979,  1980, 
1981),  Kim  and  Walker  (1984),  Isaac,  Walker  and  Thomas  (1984);  Isaac, 
McCue  and  Plott  (1985);  Isaac  and  Walker  (1988);  Andreoni  (1989), 
Brookshire  et  al.  (1989)  and  Dorsey  (1992).  This  work  demonstrates  two 
points:  (1)  the  early  findings  of  Marwell  and  Ames,  who  report  substantial 
levels  of  contributions  to  the  public  good,  are  replicable  under  certain 
experimental  conditions,  and  (2) very  different  (replicable)  results  showing  far 
more  free  riding  can  be  found  under  alternative  parametric  and  institutional 
conditions. 
The  results  presented  by  Isaac  and  Walker  (1988),  hereafter  IW,  are  of 
particular  relevance  to  the  research  presented  here.  IW  investigate  different 
concepts  of  group  size  in  the  context  of  the  standard  conjecture  that  larger 
groups  have  a  more  difficult  task  in  providing  public  goods.  A  natural 
question  is: Why  should  free  riding  increase  in  severity  as  the  group  size  is 
increased?  A  logical  response  is  that  as  the  size  of  the  group  increases,  the 
‘Note  that  we  do  not  explicitly  announce  other  subjects’  pi  values  nor  the  distribution  of 
tokens.  Isaac  and  Walker  (1989)  report  no  obvious  difference  in  behavior  in  similar  experiments 
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marginal  return  from  the  group  good  declines  (due  to  crowding).  Alternati- 
vely,  public  goods  provided  in  large  group  settings  may  be  characterized 
naturally  by  ‘small’  marginal  returns.  These  are  both  explanations  that 
depend  on  a  smaller  marginal  benefit  from  the  public  good  with  increases  in 
group  size.  Is  there,  however,  a  ‘pure  numbers’  effect  that  influences  the 
efficiency  of  public  goods  provision  ?  In  a  framework  where  G( .)  increases 
linearly  (as  in  IW  and  here),  a  pure  numbers  effect  can  be  examined  by 
varying  G’( .)  so  that  the  MPCR  remains  constant  as  N  increases.  Alternati- 
vely,  group  size effects  based  on  crowding  or  an  inherently  small  MPCR  can 
be examined  by  allowing  the  MPCR  to  vary  with  group  size. 
IW  examined  the  separate  and  combined  influences  of  a  pure  numbers 
effect  and  variations  in the  MPCR  in  groups  of  size 4 and  10. Their  primary 
conclusion  was  that  a higher  MPCR  leads  to  less free  riding  and  thus  greater 
efficiency  in  the  provision  of the  public  good.  IW  found  no  statistical  support 
for  a pure  numbers  effect. In  fact,  to  the  extent  that  there  was  any  qualitative 
difference  in  the  data,  it  was  in  the  direction  of  the  groups  of  size  10 
providing  larger  levels  of  the  public  good  than  the  groups  of  size  4.  IW  did 
find  support  for  a crowding  effect; larger  groups  exhibited  more  free  riding  if 
increases  in group  size generated  a smaller  MPCR. 
One  critique  of Iw’s  results  is that  a  lo-person  group  is not  large  enough 
to  be  behaviorally  distinct  from  a  4-person  group.  According  to  this  very 
informal  argument,  a  much  larger  group,  of  say  100, would  be  required  to 
capture  any  behavioral  properties  inherent  in  very  large  groups.  Unfortuna- 
tely,  the  effective  size  of laboratory  experiments  has  been  limited  by  both  the 
expense  of  subject  payments  and  by  the  capacity  constraints  of  existing 
laboratories.  The  initial  phase  of  the  research  reported  here  focused  on  the 
development  of  experimental  procedures  designed  to  facilitate  large  group 
experiments.  These  procedures  are  implemented  utilizing  new  software  on  the 
NovaNET  computer  system.  This  paper  reports  results  from  groups  of size 4, 
10, 40, and  100. We  believe  that  the  loo-person  groups  are  the  largest  salient 
reward,  public  goods  experiments  conducted  to  date. 
3.  Experimental  procedures  and  parameters 
Most  of  the  experiments  presented  here  employ  two  important  procedural 
modifications  relative  to  the  earlier  IW  research:  (1) decision-making  rounds 
last  several  days  rather  than  a  few  minutes,  and  (2)  rewards  are  based  on 
extra-credit  points  rather  than  cash.  We  refer  to  experiments  composed  of 
rounds  lasting  several  days  as  ‘multiple  session’  (MS)  experiments.  This 
contrasts  with  the  ‘single  session’  (SS)  experiments  of  IW,  typical  of 
laboratory  experiments  in  economics  where  all  decision  rounds  occur  in 
sequence  over  a  relatively  brief  time  span,  usually  an  hour  or  two. 6  R.M.  Isaac  et  al.,  Group  size  and  the  voluntary  provision  ofpuhlic  goods 
Experimenter  initializes  design  cells 
Information  sheet  distributed  on  timing  of  rounds 
I 
,rSubject6g<&6Toiputer  and  accesses  VCM  software  I 
L~__~______;________  _,J  Has  sub‘ect  entered  decision  for  current  round? 
NO,  ’  --YES 
fl~t%<~ry  (Round  I)?  J  Reject  subject  entry 
-  -  ----iP---  L_________ 
rGndoil;assign  to  design  cell  ]  _______~,_~~~~~_ 
Randomly  assign  to  subject  type  I 
_~--~---  ~----  ~~~~ 
I  Allocation  decision  for  tokens  ! 
1  1  entered  for  current  round 
Subject  logs  off  and  leaves  lab.  ( 
Subsequent  rounds  are  at  a  time  1 
interval  specified  on  the  I 
information  sheet. 
Fig.  1. Flow  of  multiple-session  experiments 
3.1.  Framework  for  computerized  multiple-session  experiments 
Fig.  1 shows  a  flowchart  of  the  steps  which  comprise  our  multiple-session 
VCM  experiments  using  a  salient  reward  structure  based  on  extra-credit 
points  (VCM-MS-XC).3  Subjects  participating  in  VCM-MS-XC  experiments 
were  volunteers  from  undergraduate  microeconomic  theory  classes  at  Indiana 
University  and  the  University  of  Arizona.  All  students  attending  these  classes 
received  a  handout  (see  appendix  A)  explaining  the  rules  for  participation.  In 
summary,  the  handout  informed  students:  (1)  of  the  basic  nature  of  the  group 
decision-making  exercise,  (2)  that  participation  is  voluntary  and  will  result  in 
their  earning  extra-credit  points  rather  than  cash,  (3)  of  the  specific  formula 
used  to  convert  the  cash  earnings  reported  to  them  by  the  computer  into 
extra-credit  points,  (4)  of  the  days  associated  with  each  of  the  ten  decision 
rounds,  and  (5)  of  the  specific  procedures  for  accessing  the  experiment  on 
3An  alternative  multiple-session  procedure  was  used  in  the  public  goods  experiments  of  Kim 
and  Walker  (1984).  Other  examples  of  multiple-session  procedures  exist  in  the  social  science 
literature.  Such  experiments  are  rare,  however,  relative  to  single-session  experiments. R.M.  Isaac  et  al., Group  size  and  the  voluntary provision of public goods 
NovaNET.  The  following  specific  points  describe  the  multiple-session 
procedure. 
(1)  The  NovaNET  VCM  software  handles  many  decision-making  groups 
running  simultaneously.  Before  beginning  the  experiment,  the  experimenter 
initializes  a set of parameters  for  each  decision-making  group  (called  a design 
cell).  For  example,  a  class  of  size  350  might  have  one  group  of  100,  three 
groups  of 40, and  several  groups  of  10 and  4 running  simultaneously. 
(2)  Upon  logging  onto  the  computer  for  the  first  time,  subjects  are 
assigned  to  a  design  cell  via  a  quasi-random  rotation  procedure  unknown  to 
the  subjects.  This  reduces  the  probability  that  several  acquaintances  who 
access  round  1 at  the  same  time  will be  assigned  to  the  same  group.  As part 
of  the  initialization  process,  the  experimenter  designates  each  design  cell  as 
either  ‘primary’  or  ‘secondary’.  All  primary  design  cells  are  filled  before 
remaining  subjects  are  assigned  to  secondary  cells. Inevitably,  some  students 
fail  to  meet  the  deadline  for  entering  their  round  1 decision  and  are  thus 
excluded  from  further  participation. 
(3)  After  logging  in  for  the  first  time,  subjects  work  through  a  set  of 
instructions  at  their  own  pace  and  then  enter  their  allocation  decision  for 
round  1 of  the  experiment.4  After  entering  their  decision,  subjects  log  off the 
computer  and  leave  the  lab. 
(4)  Subjects  are  allowed  to  proceed  to  the  next  round  only  after  the 
experimenter  advances  the  ‘current  round’  parameter  to  allow  for  the 
continuation  of  the  experiment.  Upon  logging  on  for  subsequent  rounds, 
subjects  are  shown  the  results  of the  previous  round  and  then  routed  directly 
to  the  decision  entry  display  for  the  current  round.  At  this  point,  subjects 
have  the  option  to  review  the  instructions  and  to  view  the  results  from  all 
prior  rounds.  It  is important  to  note  that  subjects  are  not  shown  preliminary 
information  on  the  aggregate  tokens  allocated  to  the  group  account  for  the 
current  round.  Information  on  aggregate  token  allocations  is  disseminated 
only  for  completed  rounds. 
(5)  We  cannot  guarantee  that  all  subjects  will make  an  allocation  decision 
in  each  round  (a  similar  problem  exists  in  many  field  experiments).  For  this 
reason,  the  software  allows  the  experimenter  to  specify  a  default  allocation 
decision  for  each  subject.  This  procedure  for  handling  defaults  is  explicitly 
explained  to  subjects  in  the  instructions.  An  obvious  setting  for  the  default 
decision  is  to  place  zero  tokens  in  the  group  account  since  lack  of 
participation  can  be  interpreted  as a decision  to  free  ride.  There  are  certainly 
other  reasonable  default  specifications  -  the  method  for  handling  default 
decisions  is  an  interesting  research  question  which  can  potentially  influence 
aggregate  outcomes  in  multiple-session  experiments.  For  all  VCM-MS-XC 
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experiments  reported  here,  the  default  decision  for  each  subject  was  for  all 
tokens  to  be  invested  in  the  individual  account  (private  good).  Thus,  this 
specific  VCM-MS-XC  implementation  contains  an  additional  element  which 
lowers  the  cost  of  free-riding  behavior. 
The  experimental  procedures  outlined  above  represent  a  logical  link 
between  standard  single-session  laboratory  experiments  and  actual  field 
experiments.  Certainly  some  experimental  control  is  lost  relative  to  a  strictly 
controlled  laboratory  setting;  however,  the  gain  in  feasible  group  sizes,  the 
real  time  between  allocation  decisions,  and  the  more  ‘natural’  communication 
opportunities  available  in  this  environment  add  an  element  of  parallelism 
with  non-experimental  settings  that  could  have  important  methodological 
and  behavioral  ramifications. 
3.2.  Extra-credit  performance  index 
As  explained  in  the  class  handout,  subject  i’s  experimental  dollar  earnings 
were  converted  into  the  following  ‘performance  index’  prior  to  being 
converted  into  extra-credit  points: 
i’s actual  earnings-i’s  minimum  possible  earnings 
i’s maximum  possible  earnings  -i’s  minimum  possible  earnings 
which  can  range  from  0  to  1  for  each  individual.  At  the  end  of  the  final 
round,  this  fraction  was  computed  for  each  individual  (based  on  earnings  in 
all  rounds),  multiplied  by  3,  and  added  to  the  subject’s  final  grade  average. 
Thus,  the  range  of  possible  extra-credit  points  was  [0,3].  The  performance 
index  was  used  so  that  the  maximum  and  minimum  possible  extra-credit 
earnings  did  not  depend  upon  the  design  cell  assignment.  All  classes  from 
which  subjects  were  drawn  utilized  a  loo-point  scale  and,  with  minor 
modifications,  used  a  standard  mapping  of  point  totals  into  letter  grades 
(A =90’s,  B=  80’s,  etc.).  Furthermore,  Indiana  University  (where  64  of  74  of 
the  extra-credit  experiments  were  conducted)  allows  +  and  -  letter  grades, 
so  a  unique  letter  grade  typically  comprised  a  3 to  4  point  interval. 
We  have  spent  a  great  deal  of  time  considering  questions  of  practicability 
and  fairness  in  the  use  of  extra-credit  points  as  a  motivator.  It  is  important 
to  realize  that  our  extra-credit  experiments  always  have  a  clear  pedagogical 
objective  and  become  an  integral  part  of  our  in-class  discussions  of  private 
vs.  external  benefits,  public  goods  provision,  and  free  riding.  Our  research 
procedures  were  thoroughly  reviewed  and  approved  by  the  Indiana  Univer- 
sity  Committee  for  the  Protection  of  Human  Subjects.  On  the  issue  of 
fairness,  we  can  report  that,  of  the  thousands  of  students  who  have 
participated  in  VCM-MS-XC  experiments,  there  have  been  no  grade  appeals 
in  which  these  extra-credit  points  were  an  issue.  In  fact,  feedback  from R.M.  Isaac  et  al.,  Group  size  and  the  voluntary  provision  of  public  goods  9 
Table  1 
Listing  of  experiments  by  initializations. 
Procedure  used  for 
sequencing  ~ motivation  Group  size  MPCR 
Number  of 
experiments 
MS-XC  4  0.75  10 
MS-XC  4  0.30  17 
MS-XC  10  0.75  10 
MS-XC  10  0.30  16 
MS-XC  40  0.75  6 
MS-XC  40  0.30  6 
MS-XC  40  0.03  6 
MS-XC  100  0.75  3 
MS-XC  100  0.30  3 
ss-$  40  0.30  3 
ss-$  40  0.03  1 
ss-5  10  0.30  6 
students  (and  from  other  faculty  who  have  adopted  similar  experiments  for 
purely  pedagogical  purposes)  has  been  quite  positive.’ 
3.3.  Experimental  parameters 
The  data  reported  here  are  based  on  87  new  experiments  involving  1,908 
subjects.6  Of  these  experiments,  77  were  multiple-session,  extra-credit 
reward  experiments  (VCM-MS-XC)  and  10  were  single-session,  cash  reward 
experiments  (VCM-SS-$).  Table  1 categorizes  the  new  experiments  according 
to  12  unique  initializations  utilized  in  this  research.  The  first  three  columns 
in  table  1  correspond  to  specific  components  of  an  initialization:  the 
sequencing-reward  procedure  (MS-XC  or  SS-$),  group  size  (N),  and  marginal 
per  capita  return  (MPCR)  from  a  token  allocated  to  the  group  account.  The 
fourth  column  lists  the  total  number  of  experiments  conducted  under  each 
‘In  terms  of  formal,  anonymous  feedback,  students  in  Williams’  Fall  1989  mtroductory  and 
Intermediate  Microeconomic  Theory  classes  were  given  an  end-of-semester  course  evaluation 
that  included  an  item  stating  that  the  experiment  ‘was  an  interesting  and  constructive 
supplement  to  this  course’.  The  average  responses  were  2.89  and  2.87;  where  ‘strongly  agree’=4, 
‘agree’  =  3,  ‘neither  agree  nor  disagree’  =  2,  ‘disagree’  =  1,  and  ‘stongly  disagree’  = 0.  In  addition, 
there  were  no  written  comments  complaining  that  the  method  of  awarding  extra-credit  points 
was  in  any  way  unfair. 
%ubjects  were  enrolled  in  introductory  and  intermediate  microeconomic  theory  classes 
ranging  in  size  form  about  40  to  over  350.  On  average,  87%  of  the  students  enrolled  chose  to 
participate  in  the  VCM  extra-credit  exercise.  The  subjects’  major  area  of  study  varied  widely  - 
the  majority  were  not  economics  majors.  Indiana  subjects  accessed  the  experiment  through  a 
public  microcomputer  facility  while  Arizona  subjects  accessed  the  experiment  through  the 
Economic  Science  Laboratory  computer  room.  See  appendix  A  for  details  on  the  procedure 
subjects  used  to  access  NovaNET  and  the  VCM  software.  With  very  few  exceptions,  subjects 
were  able  to  access  the  experiment  on  their  first  try  without  problems. IO  R.M.  Isaac  et  al.,  Group  size  and  the  voluntary  provision  of  public  goods 
initialization.  In  addition,  two  initialization  parameters  were  held  constant 
across  all  experiments  and  are  thus  not  listed  in  table  1:  pi  (i’s  return  per 
token  from  the  private  account)  is  $0.01  and  Zi  (i’s  token  endowment  in  each 
round)  is  50. 
4.  Initial  experimental  results 
The  presentation  of  the  results  from  our  initial  experiments  will  be 
organized  around  three  subsections:  subsection  4.1,  a  baseline  comparison  of 
VCM-MS-XC  small-group  (N =4,  N =  10)  experiments  with  the  VCM-SS-$ 
experiments  reported  by  IW;  subsection  4.2,  a  presentation  of  large  group 
(N =40,  N =  100)  experiments  using  both  extra-credit  and  cash  incentives;  and 
subsection  4.3,  an  overview  of  variations  in  individual  behavior. 
The  baseline  experiments  reported  in  subsection  4.1  were  critical  for 
extablishing  that  the  basic  IW  small-group  results  were  replicable  in  the 
VCM-MS-XC  experimental  environment.  Having  confirmed  that  small-group 
behavior  in  VCM-MS-XC  is  qualitatively  similar  to  the  behvior  reported  by 
IW,  subsection  4.2  examines  large-group  behavior.  These  results  are  particu- 
larly  interesting  in  that:  (1)  they  suggest  that  large  groups  may  be  more 
efficient  at  providing  public  goods  than  small  groups  (holding  MPCR 
constant),  and  (2)  the  positive  correlation  between  MPCR  and  efficiency 
observed  in  small  groups  appears  to  vanish  in  large  groups  (for  the 
{0.30,0.75]  MPCR  domain  previously  studied).  This  correlation  is  shown, 
however,  to  reappear  in  groups  of  size  40  with  an  MPCR  of  0.03.  Subsection 
4.3  documents  the  tremendous  diversity  in  individual  subject  behavior,  giving 
the  reader  a  more  thorough  perspective  on  the  aggregate  results  presented  in 
previous  subsections. 
4.1.  Small-group  baseline  comparison 
The  results  presented  in  this  subsection  are  from  53  VCM-MS-XC 
experiments  conducted  with  small  groups  (NE  (4,lO)).  Figs.  2  and  3  present 
a  time-series  comparison  of  the  IW  and  the  VCM-MS-XC  aggregate  data. 
The  extent  to  which  the  VCM-MS-XC  experiments  reproduce  the  results  of 
IW  is  striking. 
Observation  1.  For  a  specific  group  size  and  MPCR,  the  aggregate  pattern 
of  token  allocations  in  the  VCM-MS-XC  environment  and  the  VCM-SS-S 
environment  studied  by  IW  are  very  similar. 
This  observation  is  supported  by  two  sample  t-tests  on  data  for  each 
decision  round.  Of  the  40  t-values  (4  design  cells  x  10  rounds),  a  significant R.M.  Isaac  et  al.,  Group  size  and  the  voluntary  provision  of  public  goods  11 
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Fig.  4.  90%  confidence  bands:  group  size=40. 
difference  in  the  percentage  of  tokens  allocated  to  the  group  account  is 
observed  in  only  one  round.  Analysis  of  the  VCM-MS-XC  data  using  both 
OLS  and  Tobit  estimation  techniques  lend  additional  support  to  Obser- 
vation  1  by  reconfirming  the  positive  correlation  between  MPCR  levels  and 
efficiency  reported  by  IW. 
The  results  of  this  baseline  comparison  are  important  for  two  reasons. 
First,  they  demonstrate  that  the  IW  results  are  robust  to  changes  in 
experimental  procedures  and  the  reward  medium.  Second,  the  VCM-MS-XC 
environment  does  not  exhibit  any  obvious  behavioral  anomalies  which  would 
preclude  its  use  as  a  procedure  for  exploring  the  large-group  properties 
of  VCM. 
4.2.  Large-group  experiments 
This  subsection  begins  by  focusing  on  the  large-group  experiments  using 
extra-credit  incentives.  The  time-series  data  for  groups  of  size  40  and  100  are 
shown  in  figs.  4  and  5.  These  figures  present  90%  confidence  bands  for  the 
mean  allocation  to  the  group  account  for  the  experiments  within  each  of  the 
four  group  size  and  MPCR  combinations.  The  data  summarized  in  these 
figures  support  the  following  observation. 
Observation  2.  For  groups  of  size  40  and  100,  with  MPCR  = 0.30  or  0.75,  a R.M.  lsaac  et al.,  Group  size and  the  provision  of  goods  13 
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Fig.  5.  90%  confidence  bands:  group  size =  100. 
positive  correlation  between  the  percentage  of  tokens  allocated  to  the  group 
account  and  MPCR  does  not  exist. 
OLS  and  Tobit  regressions  of  MPCR  dummy  variables  on  the  percentage 
of  tokens  allocated  to  the  group  account  support  this  observation.  This  is in 
stark  contrast  to  groups  of  size  4  and  10, where  a  positive  MPCR  effect  is 
consistently  present  over  the  range  0.30.75.  The  next  subsection  focuses  in 
more  depth  on  why  the  MPCR  effect  appears  to  vanish  in  large  groups  for 
the  {0.30,0.75}  MPCR  domain. 
Fig.  6 presents  the  sequence  of mean  percentage  of  tokens  allocated  to  the 
group  account  for  each  of  the  VCM-MS-XC  initializations  using  a  0.30  or 
0.75  MPCR.  The  data  summarized  in  this  figure  lead  us to  the  following  two 
observations. 
Observation  3.  For  the  case  of  MPCR=0.30,  groups  of  size  40  and  100 
allocate  more  tokens  to  the  group  account  on  average  than  do  groups  of  size 
4 and  10. 
Observation  4.  For  the  case  of  MPCR=0.75,  there  is  no  discernible 
difference  in allocations  to  the  group  account  on  average  across  group  sizes. 
These  results  (supported  by  OLS  and  Tobit  regressions)  are  particularly 14  R.M.  Isaac  et  al., Group  size and  the  voluntary provision  of public goods 
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Fig.  6.  Group  size  comparison  for  high  (0.75)  and  low  (0.30)  MPCR  cells. 
striking,  since  they  do  not  support  the  existence  of  the  traditionally  assumed 
pure  group  size  effect.  In  fact,  the  MPCR =0.30  data  supporting  Observation 
3  exhibit  an  increase  in  efficiency  when  moving  -from  smaller  groups  to  larger 
groups. 
The  possibility  that  large-group  behaviour  is  an  artifact  of  the  VCM-MS- 
XC  procedures  seems  unlikely  given  the  data  from  the  smaller  groups,  but 
nonetheless  required  some  empirical  confirmation.  Reported  next  are  the 
results  of  three  40-person  VCM-SS-$  (single-session,  cash  reward)  experi- 
ments  using  MPCR =0.30.  As  discussed  previously,  in  single-session  experi- 
ments  the  ten  decision-making  rounds  occur  during  a  single  experimental 
session  lasting  one  to  two  hours.  Given  the  limited  seating  capacity  of  our 
laboratories,  these  40-person  experiments  had  to  be  conducted  ‘multi-site’ 
with  subjects  participating  simultaneously  at  Indiana  University  and  the 
University  of  Arizona  through  NovaNET.  These  cash  payment  experiments 
were  quite  expensive.  In  spite  of  the  fact  that  we  utilized  an  ‘experiment 
dollar’  to  U.S.  dollar  exchange  rate  of i,  each  experiment  cost  over  $900.7 
Fig.  7  compares  allocations  to  the  group  account  for  these  three  N=40, 
MPCR =0.30,  VCM-SS-$  experiments  (SSl,  SS2, SS3x)  with  the  means  of  the 
six  corresponding  VCM-MS-XC  experiments.  SSl  and  SS2  used  subjects 
‘Subjects  earned,  on  average,  about  $20  in  the  experiment  plus  $3  for  keeping  their 
appointment  to  participate. R.M.  Isaac  et  al.,  Group  size  and  the  voluntary  provision  of  public  goods  15 







1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
ROUND 
--m  SS-$-EXPSSl 
++  SS-$-EXP.SS3x 
+-  SS-$-EXP.SSP 
-B  MS-XC-POOLED 
Fig.  7.  Cash  (SS-$)  vs.  extra-credit  (MS-XC)  rewards:  Group  size=40,  MPCR=0.30. 
who  had  not  previously  participated  in  a  VCM  experiment,  while  SS3x  used 
experienced  subjects  randomly  drawn  from  SSl  and  SS2.  The  high  percent- 
age  of  tokens  allocated  to  the  group  account  clearly  is  not  an  artifact  of  the 
VCM-MS-XC  procedures.  In  fact,  for  these  few  experiments  using  cash 
rewards,  the  percentage  of  tokens  allocated  to  the  group  account  is  higher 
than  in  the  experiments  using  extra-credit  rewards. 
4.3.  Diversity  in  individual  behavior 
Figs.  8  and  9  document  several  features  of  individual  subject  behavior 
typical  of  many  of  our  VCM  experiments.  Fig.  8  reports  the  time-series 
behavior  for  each  subject  in  two  4-person  VCM-MS-XC  experiments.  These 
data  are  typical  of  small-group  VCM  behavior  in  that:  (1)  they  show  a 
pattern  of  token  allocations  which  is  not  bimodal  between  the  two  extremes 
of  0%  and  lOOo/0 of  tokens  placed  in  the  group  account;  and  (2)  there  is  a 16  R.M.  Isaac  et  al.,  Group  size  and  the  voluntary  provision  of  public  goods 
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Fig.  8.  Examples  of  individual  subject  decisions.  Group  size = 4. 
shift  in  allocations  associated  with  the  MPCR  conditions.  With  larger 
groups,  presenting  individual  time-series  behavior  for  each  subject  is  un- 
manageable.  Fig.  9  presents  frequency  polygons  illustrating  the  empirical 
distribution  of  token  allocations  for  all  subjects  within  two  groups  of  size  100 
during  rounds  1 and  10.  The  behavior  again  is  clearly  not  bimodal  in  round 
1.  By  period  10,  many  subjects  (3540%)  have  moved  to  a  complete  free- 
riding  allocation  of  zero  tokens  to  the  group  account;  however,  a  secondary 
peak  (15-20x)  in  frequency  appears  at  the  100%  allocation  level.  Finally,  it  is 
common  in  all  treatment  conditions  to  observe  individuals  whose  allocations 
to  the  group  account  vary  substantially  from  round  to  round.  Such  ‘pulsing’ 
behavior  could  be  interpreted  as  attempts  to  influence  others’  allocations 
through  signalling. 
Recall  that  one  of  the  parameters  specified  for  each  subject  type  in 
multiple-session  experiments  is  the  ‘default  decision’  which  is  entered  auto- 
matically  for  any  subject  who  fails  to  enter  a  decision  for  any  round.  In  the 
experiments  reported  here,  the  default  decision  is  a  zero  allocation  of  tokens 
to  the  group  account  (complete  free  riding).  Fig.  10 displays  the  time  series  of 
the  mean  percentage  of  defaults  for  group  size  4  and  100  under  each  MPCR 
condition.  Several  (tentative)  conclusions  can  be  drawn  from  the  default  data 
we  have  studied  to  date.  With  group  size  equal  to  100,  the  percentage  of 
defaults  is  relatively  low,  nearly  identical  for  both  MPCR  treatments,  and R.M.  lsaac  et  al., Group  size and  the  voluntary  provision of public goods  17 
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quite  stable  over  rounds  6  through  10  (35-4579.  In  conjunction  with  this 
default  rate,  recall  that  allocations  to  the  group  account  were  in  the  30-40% 
range  for  these  groups.  In  contrast,  with  groups  of  size  4  there  are  distinctly 
higher  defaults  in  the  low-MPCR  treatment  relative  to  the  high-MPCR 
treatment.  In  low-MPCR  groups,  the  default  rate  averages  as  high  as  60%  in 
the  later  rounds,  whereas  high-MPCR  groups  reach  a  maximum  default  rate 
of  approximately  40%  in  round  10.  These  default  rates  are  consistent  with 
the  result  that  lower  MPCR  tends  to  correspond  to  lower  token  allocations 
to  the  group  account  for  ‘small’  groups.  Finally,  note  that  we  do  observe 
subjects  actually  entering  (non-default)  decisions  of  zero  tokens  allocated  to 
the  group  account. 
5.  Factors  that  shape  behavior:  If  not  Nash,  then  what? 
The  results  presented  above  are  generally  inconsistent  with  the  complete R.M.  lsauc  et  al.,  Group  size  and  the  voluntary provision  of public  goods  19 
information  Nash  equilibrium  (NE)  prediction,  In  the  final  decision  round,  it 
is  a  dominant  strategy  for  an  individual  to  allocate  all  tokens  to  the  private 
account.  In  prior  periods,  the  unique  complete  information  multi-period  NE 
is  also  complete  free  riding.  Over  the  range  of  parameter  variations 
investigated  here,  neither  changes  in  group  size  nor  changes  in  MPCR  alter 
these  predictions.  The  NE  model  correctly  predicts  the  observed  failure  of 
our  groups  to  achieve  the  Pareto  optimum.  Furthermore,  in  some  treatments, 
decisions  show  a  marked  tendency  to  decay  toward  the  NE  prediction.  Even 
in  the  final  periods,  however,  there  is  a  notable  allocation  of  tokens  to  the 
group  account  in  most  experiments.  Given  the  inconsistency  between 
observed  behavior  and  the  complete  information  NE  prediction,  it  is  natural 
to  examine  what  assumptions  of  the  standard  model  may  not  be  met  in  the 
experiments  or  whether  alternative  modelling  approaches  might  help  explain 
the  observed  behavior.  Subsection  5.1  focuses  on  several  standard  assump- 
tions  which  may  break  down  in  the  VCM  experimental  environment.  In 
subsection  5.2,  several  non-standard  modelling  approaches  are  discussed. 
5.1.  Potential  breakdown  of  standard  Nash  assumptions 
5.1 .I.  Incomplete  information 
The  NE  model  assumes  complete  information,  but  in  fact  two  pieces  of 
information  were  not  provided  to  participants  in  our  experiments:  others’ 
token  endowments  and  others’  per-token  return  from  the  private  account. 
Because  the  return  from  the  private  account  is  necessary  to  compute  the 
opportunity  cost  of  token  allocations  to  the  group  account,  one  might 
conjecture  that  an  incomplete  information  process  along  the  lines  of  that 
described  by  Kreps  et  al.  (1982)  (for  the  finitely  repeated  Prisoner’s 
Dilemma)  is  responsible  for  the  pattern  of  the  data.  There  are,  however, 
some  problems  in  ascribing  these  results  entirely  to  the  domain  of  incomplete 
information.  The  structure  of  our  experiments,  although  similar  to  a  two- 
person  Prisoner’s  Dilemma,  is  not  identical.  In  addition,  Isaac  and  Walker 
(1989)  using  a  four-person,  MPCR=0.3  design  identical  to  that  of  VCM- 
SS-$  reported  here,  found  no  difference  in  results  when  it  was  publicly 
announced  that  token  endowments  and  returns  from  the  private  account 
were  identical  across  all  individuals.  However,  it  may  be  that  the  incomplete 
information  occurs  at  a  deeper  level  than  simply  the  structure  of  the  payoffs. 
For  example,  there  may  be  uncertainty  as  to  the  rationality  of  other  players. 
5. I .2.  Learning 
Using  a  standard  model  as  the  basis  for  evaluating  our  data  leaves  open 
the  question  of  how  quickly  individuals  are  expected  to  behave  in  accordance 
with  the  NE  model.  One  interpretation  of  the  typical  decay  process  observed 
in  VCM  is  that  of  a  ‘learning’  phenomenon  [see,  for  example,  Andreoni 20  K.M.  Isaac  et al.,  Group  size and  the  voluntary provision  of  public  goods 
(1988)].  Even  in  dominant  strategy  decision  environments,  evidence  exists 
that  some  individuals  must  learn  the  strategic  nature  of  the  optimization 
problem.’  Furthermore,  in  non-dominant  strategy  settings,  individuals  may 
have  to  learn  to  make  decisions  that  are  consistent  in  the  sense  of  a  Nash 
equilibrium.  Recently,  there  has  been  a  growing  literature  on  formal  models 
of how  individuals  ‘learn’  to  play  Nash  equilibria  [see  Fudenberg  and  Kreps 
(1988),  Moreno  and  Walker  (1993),  and  Milgrom  and  Roberts  (1991)]. 
Whether  these  models  can  be  adapted  to  have  implications  for  the  VCM 
environment  is an  open  question  for  further  research.’ 
5.1.3.  Failure  of backward  induction 
The  essence  of  the  standard  NE  model  is  that  individuals  choose  their 
actions  non-cooperatively.  In  certain  classes  of  infinitely  repeated  games, 
however,  seemingly  cooperative  outcomes  can  be  supported  by  non- 
cooperative  strategies  which  specifically  incorporate  the  multi-period  nature 
of  the  game.  Such  outcomes  are  theoretically  ruled  out  here  by  backward 
induction  from  the  known  end-point.  Failure  of  some  individuals  to  behave 
in  a  manner  consistent  with  the  logic  of  backward  induction  is one  possible 
explanation  for  deviations  from  complete  free  riding. 
5.1.4.  Incorrectly  represented  preferences 
In  our  experiments,  the  theoretical  prediction  of  complete  free  riding  is 
based  on  the  assumption  that  each  individual  is maximizing  a utility  function 
which  is  monotonically  increasing  in  experiment  earnings.  The  standard 
model  further  assumes  that  one’s  own  earnings  are  the  sole  determinant  of 
utility.  This  may  not  be  a  correct  representation  of  actual  preferences  in  the 
stage  game.  This  observation  is not  new  to  this  paper.  For  example,  Palfrey 
and  Rosenthal  (1988)  model  ‘uncontrolled  preferences’  which  derive  from 
‘acts  of  social  cooperation  or  contribution,  the  utility  of  altruism,  or  social 
duty’.  Likewise,  Andreoni  (1989)  develops  the  notion  of  a  ‘warm  glow’  from 
contributions  to  collective  goods.  In  addition  to  warm  glow  effects,  ‘fairness’ 
considerations  [Kahneman  et  al. (1986a, b)]  may  play  a role  in the  formation 
of individual  decisions. 
The  ‘incomplete  information’  and  ‘learning’  explanations  for  the  inconsis- 
tency  between  our  results  and  the  complete  information  NE  prediction  can 
be  further  addressed  with  additional  experiments.  Section  6  reports  the 
results  of  several  new  cash  payment  experiments  utilizing  a  large  number  of 
‘For  example,  there  is  an  abundance  of  evidence  that  many  subjects  do  not  immediately 
follow  the  dominant  strategy  of  bidding  full  value  in  the  second-price  sealed-bid  auction.  See,  for 
example,  Cox  et  al.  (1985)  or  Kagel  and  Levitt  (1993). 
9Most  of  this  literature,  in  contrast  to  the  designs  reported  here,  focuses  on  non-dominant 
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decision  rounds  and  enhanced  strategic  information.  The  ‘failure  of backward 
induction’  and  ‘incorrectly  represented  preferences’  explanations  require  a 
fundamental  change  in  the  approach  to  modelling  behavior  in  the  VCM 
environment. 
5.2.  Alternative  modelling  approaches 
The  inconsistency  between  observed  behavior  in the  VCM  environment  and 
the  complete  information  NE  prediction  has  led  to  the  development  of several 
alternatives  to  the  standard  Nash  model.  This  subsection  briefly  summarizes 
two  approaches  by  Ledyard  (1993)  and  Miller  and  Andreoni  (1991).  This  is 
followed  by  the  development  of  a  simple  binary  choice  modelling  approach 
designed  to  highlight  the  potential  gains  from  cooperation,  and  a  more 
complex  non-binary  approach  based  on  forward-looking  behavior. 
Ledyard  (1993)  has  proposed  an  equilibrium  model  in  which  individuals 
‘get  some  satisfaction  (a  warm  glow)  from  participating  in  a  group  that 
implicitly  and  successfully  cooperates’.  [In  modelling  a  ‘warm  glow’, 
Ledyard’s  assumption  is related  to  the  work  of  Andreoni  (1989).]  Individuals 
are  distinguished  by  types,  based  upon  the  strength  of  their  ‘warm  glow’ 
preferences.  Under  certain  assumptions  on  the  population  distribution  of 
preferences,  Ledyard  finds  that  (1) there  can  be deviations  from  complete  free 
riding  even  in  a  single-shot  game,  and  (2) individuals  will  be  more  likely  to 
deviate  from  complete  free  riding  in large  groups. 
Miller  and  Andreoni  (1991)  present  an  interesting  non-standard  model 
based  on  the  adaptive  behavior  of  replicator  dynamics.  Their  approach  is 
consistent  with  our  finding  that  the  percentage  of  tokens  allocated  to  the 
group  account  appears  to  be  directly  related  to  both  group  size  and  MPCR. 
The  replicator  dynamic  approach  also  predicts  continuous  decay  toward 
complete  free  riding  and,  ceteris  paribus,  identical  time  paths  for  designs  in 
which  (N . MPCR)  is  constant  (e.g.  N =4,  MPCR  =0.75  and  N = 10, 
MPCR=0.30).  While  the  Miller-Andreoni  model  does  capture  some  of  the 
characteristics  of  our  aggregate  VCM  data,  neither  of  the  two  predictions 
mentioned  above  is entirely  consistent  with  our  data. 
Below,  two  alternative  non-standard  VCM  modelling  approaches  are 
presented:  a  simple  all-or-nothing  (binary)  symmetric  choice  approach,  and  a 
more  complex  (non-binary)  asymmetric  choice  approach.  The  intent  of  the 
first  approach  is  simply  to  focus  on  how  changes  in  group  size  and  MPCR 
change  the  magnitude  of the  groups’  gains  from  deviating  from  complete  free 
riding.  The  intent  of  the  second  approach  is  to  outline  a  more  detailed 
decision-theoretic  explanation  of the  VCM  data. 
5.2.1.  A  symmetric  binary  choice  approach 
This  subsection  focuses  on  the  determinants  of  the  gains  from  cooperation 22  R.M.  Isaac  et  al.,  Group  size  and  the  voluntary  provision  of’public  goods 
Table  2 
Gains  from  cooperation  (in  dollars) 
N 
MPCR=0.75 
EP’J _  ENE 
MPCR  = 0.30 
EPO  _  ~“t 
4  1.00  0.10 
10  3.25  1  .oo 
40  14.50  5.50 
100  37.00  14.50 
in  a  given  period  under  the  simplifying  assumption  that  individuals  choose  to 
allocate  either  zero  tokens  (play  Nash)  or  all  tokens  (fully  cooperate)  to  the 
group  account.  Recall,  the  strategy  space  in  our  experiments  allows  for 
greater  variation  than  ‘all  tokens’  or  ‘zero  tokens’  and  all  or  nothing 
allocations  are  not  generally  consistent  with  the  data.  This  assumption, 
however,  provides  a  useful  insight  into  how  the  group  size  and  MPCR 
treatment  variables  affect  the  gains  from  cooperation,  defined  as  the 
difference  in  experimental  dollar  earnings  between  the  Pareto  optimal  and 
the  NE  outcomes.” 
Simplifying  the  notation  developed  in  subsection  2.1,  let  Zi=Z  (the 
individual  token  endowment),  pi=  1  (the  1  cent  per  token  return  from  the 
private  account),  and  recall  that  N  is  the  group  size,  G’>  1 is  the  return  to 
the  group  from  a  token  placed  in  the  group  account,  and  G’IN  <  1  is  the 
MPCR.  Note  that:  (1)  individual  earnings  at  the  Pareto  optimum  (EPo)  are 
G’Z,  and  (2)  individual  earnings  at  the  Nash  equilibrium  (EN”)  are  Z.  Thus,  if 
a  group  moves  from  the  Nash  equilibrium  to  the  Pareto  optimum  the  gains 
to  one  individual  from  full  cooperation  can  be  expressed  as 
EPo-ENE=G’Z-Z=Z(G’-l)=Z[(MPCR.N)-11, 
which  varies  directly  with  both  group  size  (holding  MPCR  constant)  and 
MPCR  (holding  group  size  constant).”  Furthermore,  the  gains  from  coope- 
ration  are  invariant  to  changes  in  MPCR  and  N  when  the  product  term 
(N.  MPCR)  is  constant. 
Table  2  displays  the  numerical  value  of  EPo-ENE  for  N = 4,  10,  40,  100 
and  MPCR  =0.75,  0.30.  The  most  striking  calculation  is  that  EPo-ENE 
increases  dramatically  as  group  size  increases  from  4  to  100  for  both  MPCR 
conditions.  To  the  extent  that  participants  are  aware  of  the  general  nature  of 
‘%I  the  IW  and  VCM-SS-$  experiments  reported  here,  explicit  cooperation  in  the  form  of 
group  discussions  was  strictly  prohibited.  In  the  VCM-MS-XC  experiments,  explicit  cooperation 
is  not  prohibited  since  communication  among  subjects  is  uncontrolled;  however,  identifying  the 
other  individuals  in  a  specific  group  would  be  very  difftcult. 
“Gains  from  cooperation  also  exist  for  movements  from  the  Nash  equilibrium  to  partial 
cooperation  (Emi<  NZ).  Symmetric  allocations  to  the  group  account  by  all  participants 
(m,=m<Z,Vi)  leads  to  gains  over  ENE of  m(G’-  1).  Asymmetric  allocations  do  not  necessarily 
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these  relationships  and  tend  to  increase  token  allocations  to  the  group 
account  as  the  gains  to  group  cooperation  increase,  then  we  expect  to  see 
allocations  to  the  group  account  increase  with  increases  in  EPo-ENE.  Our 
Observation  3 is  consistent  with  this  approach.  Furthermore,  at  the  extremes, 
this  approach  correctly  predicts  that  allocations  to  the  group  account  will  be 
greater  with  N =  100,  MPCR=0.15  than  with  N =4,  MPCR=0.3.  On  the 
other  hand,  our  results  are  not  consistent  with  this  approach  as  reported  in 
Observation  2  and  Observation  4  in  section  4.  That  is,  for  groups  of  size  40 
and  100,  with  MPCR=0.30  or  0.75,  a  positive  correlation  between  the 
percentage  of  tokens  allocated  to  the  group  account  and  MPCR  does  not 
exist,  and  for  the  case  of  MPCR=0.75,  there  is  no  discernible  difference  in 
allocations  to  the  group  account  on  average  across-group  sizes. 
This  simple  binary  choice  approach  is  useful  as  a  starting  point  for 
characterizing  the  joint  importance  of  group  size  and  MPCR  as  factors  that 
shape  behavior  in  our  VCM  environment.  In  the  next  subsection  we  begin 
the  task  of  generalizing  this  simple  approach  into  a  more  formal  model  of 
individual  behavior  which  allows  for  non-binary  asymmetric  decisions. 
5.2.2.  An  asymmetric,  forward-looking,  non-binary  approach 
Given  that  a  unilateral  increase  in  tokens  to  the  group  account  by  an 
individual  will  always  decrease  that  individual’s  earnings  in  the  current 
round,  what  plausible  rationale  exists  for  an  individual  to  deviate  from  full 
free  riding?  We  propose  a  rationale  based  on  the  individual’s  perception  of 
the  expected  intertemporal  gains  from  placing  tokens  in  the  group  account. 
Gains  are  ‘expected’  due  to  uncertainty  regarding  the  actions  of  others.  The 
standard  modelling  approach  based  on  backwards  induction  rules  out 
equilibria  containing  intertemporal  signalling.  The  modelling  approach  sug- 
gested  here  deviates  from  the  logic  of  backwards  induction,  assuming  instead 
that  individuals  view  themselves  as  involved  in  a  forward-looking  intertem- 
poral  decision  problem. 
This  approach  is  composed  of  three  principal  components:  (1)  the  assump- 
tion  that  individual  i  believes  his  decisions  have  signalling  content  to  others; 
(2)  a  benchmark  earnings  level  for  measuring  the  success  of  signalling;  and 
(3)  the  formulation  of  a  subjective  probability  function  for  evaluating  the 
likelihood  of  success. 
For  purposes  of  exposition,  suppose  that  individual  i  believes  his  allo- 
cation  decisions  have  signalling  content  and  considers  the  implications  of  his 
actions  only  one  period  into  the  future,  with  no  discounting.  Individual  i  is 
contemplating  the  possibility  of  allocating  mi  tokens  to  the  group  account  in 
both  the  current  and  the  next  period,  and  he  considers  this  effort  a  ‘success’ 
if  his  earnings  in  the  next  period  are  greater  than  his  earnings  at  the 
complete  free-riding  equilibrium  (2).  This  definition  of  success  is  clearly  ad 
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Table  3 
Values of  Mf/(N-  1) when mi=  1. 
MT/(N-  1) 
N  MPCR  =0.75  MPCR=0.30 
4  0.112  0.778 
10  0.037  0.259 
40  0.009  0.060 
100  0.003  0.023 
Let  Mj*(mi) be  the  aggregate  allocation  of  tokens  to  the  group  account  by 
the  N -  1 other  individuals  such  that  individual  i’s earnings  equal  2  when  he 
invests  mi.  Note  that  the  formulation  of  My  does  not  require  symmetric 
allocations  to  the  group  account.  Solve  for  Mj*(m,)  as follows: 
(2 -  mi) + MPCR(m,  + MT)  = 2, 
MT  = mi[( 1 -  MPCR)/MPCR]. 
Notice  that  MT  varies  inversely  with  MPCR.  Furthermore,  the  average 
number  of  tokens  per  person  required  to  generate  MT,  MT/(N  -  l),  varies 
inversely  with  group  size. 
Let  ctf(m, )  L?*)  be individual  i’s conditional  subjective  probability  at  period  t 
that  a  positive  allocation  of  m,  tokens  will  succeed.  Sz’ is  a  vector  of 
characteristics  of  the  institution  and  environment  at  time  t  which  could 
include  the  history  of  other  individuals’  behavior  and  an  individual’s 
‘homegrown’  expectations  about  the  effects  of  signalling.  The  approach 
developed  here  assumes  that  52’  includes  M)/(N  -  l),  and  that  a:(mi) 52’) and 
MT/(N  -  1) are  negatively  related.  Our  principal  conjectures  are  that:  (1)  an 
individual  will1 be  more  likely  to  signal  in  those  experimental  conditions  in 
which  a:(mi (52’) is greater,  and  (2) the  observed  mi’s will be negatively  related 
to  MT/(N  -  1). 
Table  3  shows  numerically  how  MT/(N-  1)  varies  with  the  parameters 
used  in  our  experiments  for  mi=  1.  Notice  that  the  absolute  difference 
between  the  two  MPCR  columns  is  greatest  at  N =4  and  diminishes  as  N 
increases.  Consider  the  case  of  N = 10  and  MPCR  =0.30,  where 
MS/(N  -  1) =0.259.  Assume  that  individual  i  allocates  m,>O  tokens  to  the 
group  account  in  rounds  t  and  t+  1. The  average  allocation  to  the  group 
account  of  the  nine  other  individuals  must  exceed  0.259mi  tokens  in  round 
t+  1 for  i’s  non-zero  round  t  allocation  to  be  viewed  as  a  successful  signal 
(that  is, individual  i earns  greater  than  2  in round  t +  1). 
This  model  of  asymmetric  behavior  is consistent  with  several  (but  not  all) 
aspects  of  our  data.  First,  it  is  common  in  all  treatment  conditions  to 
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from  round  to  round.  Such  ‘pulsing’  behavior  could  be  interpreted  as 
attempts  to  influence  others’  allocations  through  signalling.  Second,  as 
reported  in  Observation  3  for  the  case  of  MPCR  =0.30,  groups  of  size  40 
and  100  allocate  more  tokens  to  the  group  account  on  average  than  do 
groups  of size 4 and  10. Third,  moving  from  the  design  condition  of (N=  10, 
MPCR=0.30)  to  (N=4,  MPCR=0.75),  the  value  of  (MPCR.N)  is constant 
but  MT/(N  -  1)  decreases.  As  predicted  by  this  approach,  average  group 
allocations  for  the  N = 4, MPCR  = 0.75  experiments  consistently  exceed  those 
observed  under  the  condition  of  N = 10, MPCR  =0.30.  The  Miller-Andreoni 
replicator  dynamic  approach  and  the  simple  binary  choice  approach  predict 
no  difference  in  behavior  across  designs  where  (N.  MPCR)  is held  constant. 
Finally,  both  OLS  and  Tobit  regressions  demonstrate  the  importance  of 
MT/(N  -  1) as an  explanatory  variable  for  aggregate  allocations  to  the  group 
account.  Pooling  the  data  across  all  group  sizes  and  MPCR  conditions, 
MT/(N  -  1) is  negatively  and  significantly  correlated  with  allocations  to  the 
group  account.  Thus,  MT/(N  -  1) appears  in a statistical  sense  to  incorporate 
the  combined  impact  of  N  and  MPCR.  No  significant  difference  in  allo- 
cations  to  the  group  account  is  observed:  (1) for  groups  of  size  40  and  100 
with  MPCR=0.30  or  MPCR=0.75  (Observation  2), and  (2) across  all  group 
sizes  for  the  case  of  MPCR  =0.75  (Observation  4).  These  results  are 
inconsistent  with  the  predictions  of the  asymmetric  non-binary  approach,  the 
symmetric  binary  approach,  and  the  Miller-Andreoni  replicator  approach.  In 
addition,  there  is  no  discernible  difference  in  aggregate  allocations  for  the 
cases  of  (N =40,  MPCR  = 0.75)  and  (N = 100,  MPCR  = 0.30)  even  though 
Mf/(N-  1) changes.  Since  (MPCR.  N)  is constant  for  these  parameters,  the 
Miller-Andreoni  and  binary  choice  approaches  correctly  predict  no  difference 
in aggregate  allocations. 
In  summary,  for  MPCR  values  in  the  domain  of  {0.30,0.75},  significant 
differences  in  aggregate  allocations  are  observed  when  (1) group  size is small 
(4,lO)  and  MPCR  changes,  and  (2)  MPCR=0.30  and  group  size  changes 
from  the  small-group  (4,lO)  to  the  large-group  (40,100)  domain.  It  is in  these 
conditions  that  the  largest  absolute  changes  in  Mf/(N-  1)  occur.  Given  the 
potential  for  large  variations  in  xi  across  individuals  and  over  time, 
statistically  significant  differences  in  Emi  between  N  and  MPCR  treatment 
groups  are  unlikely  to  be  observed  in  small  samples  unless  there  are  large 
differences  in  MT/(N  -  1)  across  the  treatment  groups.  This  suggests  a 
direction  for  new  experimentation  -  large  groups  with  considerably  larger 
differences  in  Mj*/(N  -  1) across  treatment  conditions.  Such  experiments  are 
presented  in section  6 below. 
Up  to  this  point,  individual  i  has  been  assumed  to  contemplate  the  signal 
value  of  mi> 0 for  only  one  period  in  advance.  This  need  not  be  the  case  in 
an  expanded  version  of  the  non-binary  asymmetric  choice  approach.  If 
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reasonable:  as  the  final  round  approaches,  the  expected  gains  from  signaling 
diminish.  Thus,  in  contrast  to  a  purely  adaptive  or  learning  model  where  the 
number  of  rounds  completed  is  central  to  behavioral  dynamics,  this 
expanded  forward-looking  approach  suggests  that  the  number  of  rounds 
remaining  is  an  important  determinant  of  behavior  in  the  current  round. 
Varying  the  number  of  rounds  across  experiments  allows  one  to  address  this 
issue.  If  the  number  of  rounds  remaining  is  positively  correlated  with 
subjects’  expectations  that  signalling  will  be  succesful,  then  the  aggregate 
allocation  to  the  group  account  in  round  t  should  be  larger,  ceteris  paribus, 
in  experiments  with  a  longer  time  horizon.  Section  6  below  presents  several 
VCM  experiments  with  a  much  longer  time  horizon  than  any  previously 
reported. 
The  forward-looking  logic  embodied  in  this  approach  suggests  that,  as  the 
final  round  of  the  experiment  approaches,  the  expected  gains  from  coope- 
ration  diminish  since  fewer  rounds  remain.  In  the  final  round,  the  signal 
content  of  m,  is  irrelevant  and  all  individuals  have  a  dominant  strategy  of 
m,=O.  The  data,  however,  show  many  deviations  from  this  strategy.  Thus, 
any  forward-looking  model  based  on  signalling  must  be  complemented  with 
an  explanation  for  positive  allocations  to  the  group  account  in  the  final 
round.  The  literature  suggests  two  likely  candidates:  fairness  considerations 
and  warm  glow  effects. 
Clearly,  this  more  complex  forward-looking  approach  to  modelling  VCM 
behavior  has  limitations  as  currently  developed.  The  benchmark  for  success 
is  arbitrary,  and  the  approach  does  not  differentiate  between  ‘barely’ 
succeeding  and  ‘substantially’  succeeding.  Furthermore,  no  consistency 
requirements  have  been  imposed  on  the  ~i)s.  The  articulation  of  a  formal, 
fully  developed,  forward-looking  model  is  left  as  a  challenge  for  future 
research. 
6.  Additional  experimental  results 
This  section  presents  two  additional  series  of  experiments.  The  first  set 
examines  behavior  in  groups  of  size  40  with  an  MPCR  =0.03  and  is 
motivated  by  the  disappearance  of  the  MPCR  effect  in  large  groups.  The 
second  set  examines  behavior  when  subjects  are  provided  with  additional 
payoff  information  and  participate  in  a  large  number  of  decision  rounds. 
These  experiments  are  motivated,  in  part,  by  the  ‘incomplete  information’ 
and  ‘learning’  explanations  for  the  failure  to  observe  complete  free  riding.  In 
addition,  they  allow  for  further  testing  of  the  forward-looking  approach 
presented  above. 
6.1.  Large-group  experiments  with  a low  MPCR 
Recall  that  in  groups  of  size  100  and  40  there  was  no  significant  separation R.M.  Isaac  et  al.,  Group  size  and  the  voluntary  provision  of  public  goods  27 
in  cm,  for  MPCR  =0.30  vs.  MPCR=0.75.  In  groups  of  size  40  and  100, 
however,  MPCR  values  of  0.30  and  0.75  yield  values  of  MT/(N  -  1)  which 
are  quite  close  in  an  absolute  sense.  In  a  large-group  experiment  with  a  very 
low  MPCR,  one  can  recapture  the  feature  of  the  small-group  MPCR=0.30 
experiments  of  a  relatively  large  value  of  MJ/(N  -  1).  Specifically,  in  a 
40-person  group  with  MPCR  =0.03,  M,*/( N -  1) = 0.83m,.  This  implies  that 
the  average  allocation  of  tokens  to  the  group  account  by  the  (N -  1)  other 
individuals  must  be  greater  than  0.83mi  for  individual  i’s  earnings  to  be 
greater  than  ENE.  Thus,  such  experiments  should  exhibit  lower  Emi  than 
those  with  MPCR=0.30  or  MPCR  =0.75. 
The  results  of  seven  40-person  MPCR  = 0.03  experiments  are  reported  in 
this  subsection;  six  using  the  VCM-MS-XC  procedures  and  one  using  the 
VCM-SS-$  procedure.  The  subjects  in  the  later  experiment  (SS4x)  were 
randomly  drawn  from  the  group  of  80  subjects  who  participated  in 
experiments  SS1  and  SS2  reported  above.”  Fig.  11  displays  the  mean  results 
of  the  VCM-MS-XC  experiments  and  the  data  from  the  single  VCM-SS-$ 
experiment.  As  predicted,  these  40-person  groups  exhibit  a  substantial  decay 
in  allocations  to  the  group  account.  Thus,  the  MPCR  effect  does  appear  to 
exist  in  40-person  experiments  for  MPCR  values  much  smaller  than  those 
used  by  IW. 
6.2.  Experiments  with  additional  payoff  information  and a large  number  of 
decision  rounds 
The  single-session  experiments  reported  in  this  subsection  all  employ  cash 
rewards,  N =  10,  and  MPCR  =0.30.  There  are  two  design  changes  relative  to 
the  previously  reported  experiments.  First,  subjects  were  provided  with  a 
handout  (appendix  B)  explicitly  stating  the  conditions  in  which:  (1)  an 
individual  receives  the  maximum  possible  earnings,  (2)  an  individual  receives 
the  minimum  possible  earnings,  (3)  the  group  as  a  whole  receives  the 
maximum  possible  earnings,  and  (4)  the  group  as  a  whole  receives  the 
minimum  possible  earnings.  Second,  the  number  of  decision  rounds  varied 
from  10  in  three  experiments  to  40  in  two  experiments  to  60  in  one 
experiment.  The  subjects  in  the  40-round  experiments  were  drawn  from  a 
pool  of  subjects  with  experience  in  lo-round  VCM  experiments.  The  subjects 
in  the  60-round  experiment  were  drawn  from  the  two  40-round 
experiments.13 
Fig.  12  summarizes  the  results  from  these  additional  experiments.  The  top 
“Subjects  in  SS4x  were  paid  $2  cash  for  each  ‘experiment  dollar’  earned  due  to  the  very  low 
MPCR.  Cash  earnings  in  SS4x  were  approximately  one-half  the  earnings  in  the  other  three 
single-session  experiments. 
‘%ubjects  in  the  40-  and  60-round  experiments  were  paid  in  cash  $0.50  for  each  ‘experiment 
dollar’  earned  due  to  the  large  number  of  decision  rounds. 28  R.M.  Isaac  et  al., Group  size and  the  voluntary provision  of public goods 
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Fig.  11.  Experiments  using  group  size  40  and  a  very  low  (0.03)  MPCR. 
panel  displays  the  sequence  of  mean  allocations  to  the  group  account  from 
two  series  focusing  solely  on  the  effect  of  additional  payoff  information.  The 
first  series,  SS-$-IW,  were  previously  reported  in  section  4.  The  second  series, 
SS-$-INFO,  are  the  new  lo-round  experiments  in  which  subjects  received  the 
additional  payoff  information.  Examining  each  decision  round  separately,  t- 
tests  indicate  that  the  differences  in  means  are  insignificant. 
The  bottom  left  panel  reports  the  results  of  two  experiments  with  40 
decision  rounds  and  the  additional  payoff  information.  These  experiments 
exhibit  a  pattern  of  allocations  to  the  group  account  in  which  group 
allocations  begin  at  a  mean  of  57.5%  and  decay  slowly  (but  not  montoni- 
tally)  to  a  mean  of  6.8%  by  round  40.  The  bottom  right  panel  reports  the 
results  of  one  experiment  with  60  decision  rounds  and  the  additional R.M.  Isaac  et  al.,  Group  size and  the  voluntary  provision  of  public goods  29 
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Fig.  12.  Experiments  with  additional  payoff  information  and  a  larger  number  of  decision  rounds. 30  R.M.  Isaac  et  al.,  Group  size  and  the  voluntary  provision  qfpublic  goods 
information.  In  this  experiment,  group  allocations  begin  at  51%  of  total 
endowment  and  decay  slowly  (but  not  monotonically)  to  19.2oi;; by  round  60. 
These  experiments  supplement  our  VCM  database  in  several  interesting 
ways.  Even  with  a  richer  information  environment,  highly  experienced 
subject  groups  continue  to  follow  a  pattern  of  behavior  inconsistent  with  the 
predictions  of  the  complete  information  Nash  model.  Thus,  the  results 
reported  in  section  4  are  not  an  artifact  of  limiting  decisions  to  10  rounds. 
Furthermore,  the  rate  of  decay  of  allocations  to  the  group  account  is 
inversely  related  to  the  number  of  decision  rounds.  For  example,  compare 
rounds  8-10  in  the  IO-round  experiments  with  rounds  8-10  in  the  40-  and 
60-round  experiments.  Or,  compare  rounds  35-40  in  the  40-round  experi- 
ments  with  rounds  35-40  in  the  60-round  experiment.  Clearly,  the  rate  of 
decay  is  faster  the  shorter  the  time  horizon  of  the  experiment.  This  result  is 
inconsistent  with  backward  induction  models,  and  purely  adaptive  or 
learning  models  based  on  the  number  of  rounds  completed.  This  aspect  of 
the  VCM  data  is  consistent  with  a  forward-looking  modelling  approach 
based  on  the  potential  gains  from  cooperation. 
The  diversity  in  individual  behavior  is  illustrated  in  fig.  13  which  displays 
the  group  allocation  decisions  for  three  subjects  from  the  60-round  experi- 
ment.  These  three  subjects  typify  three  types  of  behavior  we  regularly 
observe.  Subject  1  characterizes  ‘slow  decay  with  pulsing’  and  follows  a 
pattern  generally  consistent  with  the  aggregate  data  observed  in  many 
experiments.  Subject  2  characterizes  ‘weak  free  rider  with  pulsing’.  Finally, 
subject  10  characterizes  ‘strong  pulsing’.  It  is  worth  emphasizing  that  the 
subjects  in  this  60-round  experiment  were  ‘super  experienced’,  having  partici- 
pated  in  an  initial  lo-round  trainer  experiment  without  the  additional  payoff 
information  (not  reported  here),  one  of  the  IO-round  experiments  with 
additional  payoff  information,  and  one  of  the  40-round  experiments  with 
additional  payoff  information.  Clearly,  no  simple  symmetric  choice  model 
can  capture  the  individual  behavior  observed  in  the  VCM  environment. 
7.  Summary  of  results 
This  paper  presents  new  evidence  on  the  existence  of  group  size  effects  in 
the  provision  of  a  pure  public  good  via  voluntary  contributions.  In  order  to 
overcome  the  methodological  difficulties  associated  with  large-group  experi- 
ments,  ‘multiple-session’  experimental  procedures  and  the  use  of  extra-credit 
rewards  are  explored.  Decision-making  groups  of  size  4,  10,  40,  and  100 
provide  replicable  results  contradicting  the  widely  held  premise  that  a 
group’s  ability  to  provide  the  optimal  level  of  a  pure  public  good  is  inversely 
related  to  group  size. 
The  results  of  a  series  of  (extra-credit,  multiple-session)  baseline  experi- 
ments  with  groups  of  size  4  and  10  are  consistent  with  the  (cash,  single- R.M.  Isaac  et  al.,  Group  size  and  the  voluntary  provision  of  public  goods  31 
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Fig.  13.  Illustrative  subject  data. 32  R.M.  Isaac  et  al.,  Group  size  and  the  voluntary  provision  cfpuhlic  goods 
session)  experimental  results  reported  by  Isaac  and  Walker  (1988)  that  a 
higher  marginal  benefit  from  the  public  good  leads  to  less  free  riding  and 
thus  greater  efficiency.  This  is  in  spite  of  the  fact  that,  in  this  experimental 
setting,  the  single-period  dominant  strategy  is  a  zero  allocation  of  resources 
to  the  public  good. 
Our  experiments  with  groups  of  size  40  and  100  yield  several  surprising 
results.  First,  the  impact  from  variations  in  the  magnitude  of  the  marginal 
per  capita  return  from  the  public  good  (MPCR)  appears  to  vanish  over  the 
range  [0.30,0.75].  Second,  with  an  MPCR  of  0.30,  groups  of  size  40  and  100 
provide  the  public  good  at  higher  levels  of  efficiency  than  groups  of  size  4 
and  10.  Third,  with  an  MPCR  of  0.75,  there  is  no  significant  difference  in 
efficiency  due  to  group  size. 
Several  additional  experiments  utilizing  cash  rewards  and  standard  single- 
session  procedures  suggest  that  the  unexpectedly  high  efficiency  levels 
generated  by  large  groups  are  not  simply  an  artifact  of  extra-credit  rewards 
or  multiple-session  procedures.  Forty-person  experiments  with  a  very  low 
MPCR  of  0.03  yield  the  low  efficiency  levels  previously  observed  with  small 
groups  and  an  MPCR  of  0.30.  The  existence  of  an  ‘MPCR  effect’  is  thus 
reconfirmed  for  large  groups.  Our  research  reveals,  however,  that  behavior  is 
influenced  by  a  subtle  interaction  between  group  size  and  MPCR  rather  than 
simply  the  shear  magnitude  of  either.  Experiments  using  both  additional 
payoff  information  and  as  many  as  60  decision  rounds  provided  further 
evidence  of  the  failure  of  the  standard  backward  induction  model. 
Appendix  A: Example  of  classroom  handout  used  in  multiple-session  VCM 
experiments 
GROUP  INVESTMENT  EXPERIMENT 
EXTRA  CREDIT  EXERCISE 
El03  -  SPRING  90  -  PROFESSOR  WALKER 
You  will  have  the  opportunity  to  participate  in  a  decision  making  exercise 
referred  to  as  the  “Group  Investment  Experiment”.  Participation  is  totally 
voluntary. 
The  exercise  consists  of  a  series  of  decision  making  rounds.  In  each  round 
you  will  choose  to  allocate  “tokens”  between  a  “private  account”  and  a 
“group  account”.  You  will  access  the  experiment  on  the  NOVANET 
(PLATO)  computer  network  using  the  MICROCOMPUTERS  in  BH307 
and  other  on  campus  sites  listed  on  the  second  page.  In  the  first  round  you 
will  receive  instructions  describing  the  exercise  and  you  will  make  your  tirst 
allocation  decision. 
The  instructions  explain  how  you  can  earn  money  in  this  exercise.  You  will R.M.  Isaac  et  al.,  Group  size  and  the  voluntary  provision  of  public  goods  33 
NOT  be  paid  the  money.  Rather,  you  will  receive  extra-credit  points  based 
on  the  amount  of  money  you  earn.  The  maximum  number  of  extra-credit 
points  is  3  and  the  minimum  is  0.  The  extra-credit  points  will  be  added  to 
your  final  course  average. 
All  students  will  not  face  exactly  the  same  decisions.  For  this  reason,  your 
earnings  potential  in  money  will  not  be  the  same.  Extra-credit  points  will  be 
awarded  based  on  an  individual’s  money  earnings  relative  to  the  maximum 
possible  for  that  individual  and  relative  to  the  minimum  possible  for  that 
individual.  For  example,  if  one  individual  has  maximum  possible  earnings  of 
$100  and  he/she  earns  $100  then  that  individual  will  earn  3  points.  Likewise, 
if  one  individual  has  a  maximum  possible  of  $20  and  he/she  earns  $20  then 
that  individual  will  earn  3  points.  In  general,  the  more  money  you  earn  the 
greater  the  number  of  extra-credit  points  that  you  will  receive.  Even  though 
potential  money  earnings  is  not  the  same  for  everyone,  the  maximum  and 
minimum  number  of  extra-credit  points  is  the  same  for  everyone. 
The  specific  formula  which  will  be  used  in  converting  money  earnings  into 
extra-credit  points  for  each  student  (say,  student  X)  will  be: 
X’s Actual  Earnings-X’s  Minimum  Possible  Earnings 
X’s Maximum  Possible  Earnings-X’s  Minimum  Possible  Earnings 
This  fraction  can  range  from  0  to  1  for  each  individual.  At  the  end  of  the 
final  decision  making  round,  this  fraction  will  be  computed  for  each 
individual  (based  on  earnings  in  all  rounds)  and  multiplied  by  100.  This  gives 
each  person  a  score  of  0  to  100  which  will  be  entrered  in  my  electronic  grade 
book.  This  score  will  be  multiplied  by  .03  and  the  result  added  to  your  final 
grade  average.  For  example:  assume  an  individual  has  a  final  score  of 
(.4.5) x  100=45.  That  person  will  have  .03 x 45 =  1.35  points  added  to  their 
final  average  for  the  course.  Thus,  it  is  clearly  possible  to  earn  fractional 
extra-credit  points. 
How  to  access  NOVANET  (PLATO) 
Using  the  microcomputers  in  BH307  (or  other  sites),  the  “IU  Micro  Menu 
System”  allows  access  to  NOVANET  (PLATO)  via  the  COMMUNICA- 
TIONS  MENU.  Choose  option  5  on  the  Communications  Menu,  listed  as 
“NovaNET  (PLATO)“.  Use  the  following  information  to  access  the  extra- 
credit  exercise: 
NOVANET  name:  vcm  NOVANET  group:  iuecon 
After  you  have  logged  on  to  NOVANET,  you  will  be  automatically  routed 
to  the  “Group  Investment  Experiment”.  You  will  then  be  ased  to  type  your 
“class-tile”  and  your  last  name.  Use  the  following  information: 34  R.M.  Isaac  et  al.,  Group  size  and  the  voluntary  provision  of  public  goods 
Class tile: jw103  (Press  NEXT  when  finished  typing) 
Last  name:  first  6 letters  of  your  last  name  plus  the  last  4  numbers  in  your 
social  security  number. 
(Press  NEXT  when  finished  typing) 
For  example,  if Ronald  Raygun  has  SS #  123-45-6789  then  this  student’s  last 
name  would  be  entered  as  raygun6789.  Jim  McDonald  with  SS #333-24- 
4321  would  enter  mcdona4321.  Jill  Smith  with  SS#234-56-9876  would  enter 
smith9876. 
After  you  log  in,  you  will be  routed  to  a  set  of  instructions  that  describe  the 
extra  credit  exercise.  The  first  round  will  probably  take  from  20  to  30 
minutes  (feel  free  to  take  all  the  time  you  find  necessary).  Subsequent 
decision  rounds  may  be  shorter  since  you  will  not  have  to  review  the 
instructions  unless  you  desire  to  do  so.  The  results  of  your  performance  are 
automatically  stored  in the  computer. 
The  exercise  will  consist  of  10  decision  making  rounds.  The  starting  and 
ending  times  for  each  round  are: 
BEGIN 
Round  1  -  8:00 am  on  Tuesday  2/13 
Round  2  -  8:00 am  on  Thursday  2122 
Round  3  -  12 noon  on  Sunday  2125 
Round  4  -  8:00 am  on  Thursday  3/l 
Round  5  -  12 noon  on  Sunday  314 
Round  6  -  8:00 am  on  Thursday  318 
Round  7  -  12 noon  on  Sunday  3118 
Round  8  -  8:00 am  on  Thursday  3122 
Round  9  -  12 noon  on  Sunday  3/25 
Round  10 -  8:00 am  on  Thursday  3129 
Those  students  who  do  not  enter  a 
END 
12 noon  on  Wednesday  2121 
12 noon  on  Saturday  2/24 
12 noon  Wednesday  2128 
12 noon  Saturday  313 
12 noon  Wednesday  317 
12 noon  Saturday  3117 
12 noon  Wednesday  3121 
12 noon  Saturday  3124 
12 noon  Wednesday  3128 
12 noon  Saturday  313  1 
decision  for  the  first  round  of  the 
experiment  will  be  eliminated  from  participating  in  all  subsequent  rounds 
and  thus  will  earn  0  extra-credit  points.  The  instructions  explain  what 
happens  for  those  students  who  participate  in  the  first  round  but  do  not 
make  a decision  in one  or  more  of the  other  rounds. 
TAKE  THIS  HANDOUT  WITH  YOU  WHEN  YOU  GO  TO  ENTER 
YOUR  DECISIONS: 
Hours  for  BH  307:  Sunday  through  Thursday  (9am  to  9:45pm),  F  and  Sat. 
(9am  to  445pm) 
Other  Sites:  BH308;  Business  -  417 and  101; Hyper  154. R.M.  Isaac  et  al.,  Group  size  and  the  voluntary  provision  of  public  goods  35 
Appendix  B:  Additional  payoff  information 
The  following  information  is  to  help  you  understand  how  your  decisions  in 
this  experiment  will  affect  your  earnings. 
The  following  statements  describe  several  important  aspects  of  your  mini- 
mum  and  maximum  possible  earnings  and  the  aggregate  earnings  of 
everyone  in  the  experiment. 
1.  An  individual  will  receive  the  maximum  possible  earnings  ($1.85  per 
round)  only  if  this  individual  allocates  all  50  tokens  to  the  PRIVATE 
account  and  everyone  else  in  the  experiment  allocates  all  tokens  to  the 
GROUP  account. 
2.  An  individual  will  receive  the  minimum  possible  earnings  ($.15  per  round) 
only  if  this  individual  allocates  all  50  tokens  to  the  GROUP  account  and 
everyone  else  in  the  experiment  allocates  all  tokens  to  the  PRIVATE 
account. 
3.  A  decision-making  group  as  a  whole  will  receive  the  maximum  possible 
group  earnings  ($1.50  for  each  individual  in  the  group  per  round)  if  all 
individuals  allocate  all  tokens  to  the  GROUP  account. 
4.  A  decision-making  group  as  a  whole  will  receive  the  minimum  possible 
group  earnings  ($.50  for  each  individual  in  the  group  per  round)  if  all 
individuals  allocate  all  tokens  to  the  PRIVATE  account. 
Note:  The  above  information  is  expressed  in  “experiment  dollars”.  At  the  end 
of  the  experiment  you  will  be  paid  privately  (in  cash)  one-half  of  your 
experiment  dollar  earnings  plus  $3.00  cash  for  showing  up  on  time. 
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